Despite our booming economy, more than 43 million Americans-nearly one in six of the U.S. population-lack health insurance coverage. The uninsured often cannot afford necessary preventive and curative care. Nearly half report that they failed to get medical attention for a problem in the previous year because of the costs of care (Budetti et al. 1999) . Studies show that people who lack insurance face a higher risk of overall mortality, a higher risk of mortality from specific causes, and higher risks of serious medical problems (such as a ruptured appendix) (Franks, Clancy, and Gold 1993; Ayanian et al. 1993; Braveman et al. 1994) . People without insurance not only face dire health consequences, but also financial disaster if they become very sick. It is estimated that the uninsured are twice as likely to go without needed care as are their insured counterparts. Nearly onethird of the uninsured say they have been contacted by bill collectors about unpaid medical bills (Budetti et al. 1999) .
The options described in this issue extend previous work by others (see the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation Project on Incremental Reform) to identify ways to insure the uninsured or unstably insured. The compilation contains papers commissioned by the Commonwealth Fund Task Force on the Future of Health Insurance to focus on the working uninsured whose family incomes often are above the federal poverty line. For example, a full-time worker paid the minimum wage earns about 133% of the federal poverty line for a single adult. The options described in this issue are intended to reach the uninsured population with earnings at or above this level and, more generally, to provide more affordable insurance options for the working insured. This paper comprises three sections. The first provides a profile of the uninsured under age 65 and describes the challenges of incrementally expanding coverage to different groups within this population. The second section describes issues and options that arise in designing incremental coverage expansions. The third section outlines three types of strategies for incremental expansion (expanding public programs, using individual incentives, and building on the employer base), as well as approaches that address the unique concerns of unemployed and older workers. This section synthesizes and summarizes the costs and effects of the proposals contained in the 10 papers that were commissioned by the Task Force and which follow in this issue.
Who is Uninsured? The Challenges of Expanding Coverage Incrementally
There are three main reasons why people may lack health insurance. First, most uninsured people's incomes are so low that they cannot afford coverage. In 2000, the average insurance policy covering a single employee under 65 cost $2,424, while a family policy cost $6,348 (Gabel et al. 2000) . Employersponsored coverage is generally less costly than similar coverage purchased in the individual market. For more than half of the uninsured, insurance coverage for a family would cost more than 25% of family income (see Table 1 ). Second, in today's market, private health insurance is most economically obtained through an employer, and more than 90% of those with private insurance obtain it this way. However, most uninsured people are not offered employment-based coverage directly or through a family member. More than three-quarters of the uninsured are members of working families (including dependents), but for 60% of the uninsured, the worker's firm does not offer health insurance coverage (see Figure 1 ). Less than 20% of the uninsured are in families where a worker is offered, but turns down, coverage.
Finally, eligibility for public insurance programs is quite limited, especially for adults without children. Children in families with incomes below the federal poverty level are eligible for Medicaid in all states. In most states, however, a single adult with income as low as $4,000 a year would not qualify for Medicaid, and in the 11 states without programs for the medically needy, no nondisabled single adults under 65 can qualify for Medicaid (author's tabulations from the Green Book, U.S. House Ways and Means Committee 2000).
Challenges in Getting Coverage to the Uninsured
Most of the uninsured are low-income people who lack access to both employer-based coverage and public coverage. However, this broad generalization covers a diverse population with complex needs. Designing coverage options for this population requires a more precise understanding of its characteristics.
A sense of the diversity among the uninsured is illustrated by some marked contrasts within this population. Figure 2 divides the uninsured into groups of roughly equal size for three different characteristics. Many of the uninsured are in excellent health (31%)-but a slightly larger share report that their health is only poor, fair, or good (37%). Almost a quarter are young adults, but an equal proportion are age 45 or older, and many in this older group are nearing retirement age. The number working in small firms (33%) is just slightly larger than the number working in very large firms. Clearly, no single health insurance option will work for every one of these very disparate groups.
The uninsured population is also constantly changing. People gain and lose insurance coverage and, even when they remain uninsured, move among different subgroups within the uninsured population (Swartz, Marcotte, and McBride 1993; Swartz and McBride 1990) . Consider the increase in the number of uninsured Americans from 43 million to 44 million between 1997 and 1998 (see Figure 3) .
1 Between 1997 and 1998, about 21 million previously uninsured Americans gained insurance coverage. Most of them (two-thirds) became privately insured through employment. An additional 22 million previously insured Americans lost insurance coverage. Most of them (two-thirds) lost private, employment-based insurance coverage. Many of the 22 million who were uninsured in both years also experienced substantial changes in their life circumstances. Seventeen percent of those who remained uninsured and initially had been employed in small firms moved to larger firms. Nearly 60% saw their income rise or fall by 50% or more. The year-to-year comparisons considered here mask even more short-term transitions in the population of the uninsured. About 28% of the uninsured spend less than six months without coverage, but an estimated 40% of the uninsured lack coverage for a period of 18 months or more (Short and Klerman 1998) . One key challenge is to find ways to help people avoid spells of uninsurance, perhaps by developing forms of coverage that allow people to remain insured as their circumstances change.
As these figures suggest, the number of uninsured people at any given time exceeds the number uninsured for an entire year. The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which tracks coverage over time and asks respondents about insurance at various intervals during the survey, has found that as many as 55 million Americans lack insurance at some time during the year. Those who are currently insured but were uninsured earlier in the year resemble, both in their demographic characteristics and health services experiences, those who are currently uninsured (Schoen and DesRoches 2000) .
The transitory nature of insurance loss and gain poses serious problems for policymakers. To assist people who gain and lose coverage over relatively short periods, new programs must address issues of timing. New sources of insurance coverage must be made available for people who lose their current coverage, or else adults and their families must somehow be enabled to keep their insurance as circumstances change.
Because the uninsured population is constantly changing, it is difficult to effectively target programs to them. For example, programs that aim to improve targeting by limiting eligibility to those who do not now (or did not in the recent past) have access to employer-sponsored coverage will be undermined by the fact that a large (but hard to identify) fraction of the uninsured eventually will gain private coverage anyway.
Some subgroups of the uninsured population pose additional challenges. Private health insurers charge high premiums, or refuse to sell complete coverage, to those who are or can be expected to be in poor health. As Figure 4 shows, nearly 50% of the uninsured have less than very good health or are over age 55 and so are at greater risk of developing poor health. While rating restrictions and insurance reforms seek to make coverage available to all, such reforms have been implemented in only a handful of states and rarely address affordability; when implemented, they may lead to serious unintended problems in the operation of the individual insurance market.
Noncitizens make up 7% of the U.S. population, but nearly 20% of the uninsured population, and much higher fractions of the uninsured in several states. Most of these noncitizens are legal permanent residents in the United States. Rates of coverage are low among noncitizens partly because most are not eligible for most public programs. However, Figure  5 shows that differences in public coverage explain only a small part of the lower rates of coverage among noncitizens. Private insurance coverage among noncitizens is only two-thirds as high as that among citizens, although noncitizens are about as likely as citizens to work (Quinn and Abt Associates 2000) .
The Take-Up Problem
The most troubling subgroup of the currently uninsured comprises those who are formally eligible for some public insurance program, generally Medicaid or the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), but remain uninsured. Over one-quarter of all uninsured adults, and nearly two-thirds of uninsured children, appear to be eligible for public coverage on the basis of their income and family circumstances-a total of 15 million people (author's estimate). Income and family circumstances are not perfect proxies for the complex eligibility criteria of public programs, however, so this is likely to be an overestimate (Remler, Rachlin, and Glied 2000) . Nonetheless, it is clear that many eligible people do not take up free coverage or coverage at modest premiums. We can understand why take-up rates for free coverage are so low if we compare the procedure for obtaining public coverage with the process that most insured Americans go through to gain coverage (see Figure 6 ). For most insured Americans, coverage is nearly automatic.
2 Take-up rates for Medicare are nearly 100%, largely because nearly all of those who turn 65 are automatically enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B. Their Social Security payments are automatically reduced to cover their Medicare Part B premium shares. They must take deliberate steps to turn down this Part B coverage. Once an individual is enrolled in these programs, re-enrollment is automatic.
Take-up rates for employer-sponsored coverage average nearly 90%, and nearly 100% for those who need not contribute to the cost of their own coverage. Workers who find jobs that offer coverage are often automatically enrolled in a plan when they begin their job (or first qualify for coverage), unless they explicitly decline coverage. In nearly all cases, employers select one or more plans for their employees, present employees with the required forms, and make any necessary payroll deductions. Once an individual is enrolled in an employment-based plan, re-enrollment is nearly automatic. In most cases, employees must choose explicitly to opt out of coverage once they have enrolled.
In contrast, to participate in need-based public programs, eligible individuals must, at a minimum, learn about the existence of the program; obtain application materials; apply to the program and demonstrate eligibility (which may entail a visit to an eligibility office to submit numerous documents verifying income, assets, citizenship, residency, age of children, and even job and employer); and in some cases, make periodic payments to an insurer. This multi-stage process requires uninsured people, most of whom are members of low-income families with many equally pressing demands, to take several, often complicated steps. Failure at any stage means a continued lack of coverage. Re-enrollment often requires proving eligibility again, with another round of forms, supporting documents, and eligibility office visits. In this context, the moderate take-up rates observed, even when premiums are heavily subsidized, are hardly surprising. In short, coverage through public health insurance programs for working people is typically neither automatic nor easy.
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Incremental Coverage Issues and Options
The characteristics of the uninsured raise several issues that will determine the likely success of alternative policy proposals. First, most of the uninsured are poor and will need substantial premium assistance in order to afford coverage. Research shows that very low-income people are much more likely to participate in a program that is free than in one that requires even modest contributions (Marquis and Long 1995) . For example, participation in new state insurance programs that use sliding-scale premiums is substantially lower when out-of-pocket premium shares are higher (Ku and Coughlin 1999/2000) . Participation appears to fall off steeply when premium costs reach or exceed 5% of income.
Second, as the previous discussion of take-up suggests, generous incentives alone will not ensure that substantial numbers of the uninsured participate in a new program, nor will incentives alone keep people in programs. Premium assistance must be coupled with aggressive measures to make enrollment and reenrollment easier if participation is to increase.
Efforts to expand coverage incrementally also must consider ways to attract and contact the uninsured. Some approaches would use other programs and settings to find potentially eligible families. For example, some states focus their SCHIP enrollment efforts on families who already participate in other programs, such as food stamp or school lunch programs. States that build on existing program participation send application forms to all families with children enrolled in these programs. Employers also could serve as conduits to the uninsured. Several existing programs, such as the earned income tax credit (EITC), require employers to provide information to potentially eligible employees. Employers could be mandated to provide information about the existence of health insurance programs. Employers also could be required to make payroll deductions on behalf of employees who choose to participate in a program. Similar mandates for payroll deduction already exist for child support payment and federal student loans in default.
A still more aggressive approach would be to automatically enroll the uninsured, and provide them with an option to turn down coverage if they wished. Automatic enrollment for the uninsured is complicated because they are so hard to identify. For example, many workers who do not obtain coverage from their employers obtain it through a spouse. It would be extremely difficult to provide automatic dependent coverage for two-worker families. Nonetheless, the considerable advantages of automatic enrollment make it worth considering this path.
Third, most of the uninsured have no natural venue in which to buy coverage. Premium assistance alone would enable them to buy coverage only in the individual market, which might be difficult and costly. The uninsured would benefit from having an alternative that provided the premium advantages and efficiencies of group coverage. Many of the uninsured might obtain group coverage if more employers were encouraged to offer health insurance, or if new purchasing arrangements were developed. In addition, existing purchasing groups, such as state and federal employee benefit pools and public programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP) could be modified to offer coverage to those without access to other forms of group insurance.
The significant share of the uninsured with large health risks finds it most difficult to rely on the individual market (Simantov, Schoen, and Bruegman 2000) . Programs based on individual tax credits, for example, generally would provide the same amount of money to all qualifying beneficiaries of the same income and family size, regardless of age or health status. This means that, even with subsidies, higherrisk people might be unable to afford coverage. 4 For example, data from individual markets indicate that coverage for a healthy adult age 60 might cost more than $8,000 for a standard individual plan, more than four times as much as a healthy 25-year-old would pay for the same coverage (Simantov, Schoen, and Bruegman 2000) .
One way to address this problem is to impose community rating or age-band limits. This would bring down average premiums for high-risk people, at least in the short term. Unfortunately, it might do so at the cost of driving many low-risk people out of the insurance pool, unless efforts were made to keep them in. In the long run, it might lead to disintegration of the health insurance market as insurance plans failed to attract enough healthy people to stay in business. This problem of adverse selection is likely to be even more serious if coverage within a voluntary pool, such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), SCHIP, or a private purchasing pool, is community rated but exists within a non-community-rated insurance market. Higher-risk people are far more likely to join the community-rated pool than are low-risk people. To sustain community rates, systems of reinsurance or explicit anti-selection subsidies could help sustain these groups.
Public reinsurance can effectively address problems of selection in a group purchasing venue, and simultaneously lower premiums for all participants and, perhaps, attract insurers to participate in the pool. Figure 7 illustrates how a public reinsurance pool for the highest-cost cases could reduce premiums overall. Removing as little as 1% of highest-cost cases from the pool would reduce premium costs by 14% (Actuarial Research Corporation 2000) . Of course, these costs would still have to be borne by the public reinsurance provider.
There are other ways to reduce selection in new purchasing pools and programs. All qualifying beneficiaries could be required to purchase coverage through pools. Healthier people still might reject coverage altogether, especially if premium assistance did not cover the full cost of care, but they would not be able to select against the pool by remaining outside the community-rated purchasing venue. Employer pools reduce selection partly by limiting enrollment to specific periods. Many purchasing venue proposals also incorporate this feature. However, if the timing of enrollment were limited, exceptions for people who had lost health insurance coverage would have to be made, consistent with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Finally, special incentive arrangements could be targeted at high-risk groups, such as those over 55 (Short, Shea, and Powell 2000) .
Fourth, people gain and lose coverage throughout the year. Many uninsured people spend long periods without health insurance. This group will have ample time to learn about the availability of new coverage options and can be served sensibly by programs that measure eligibility annually. However, many people who are uninsured at any given time become insured shortly thereafter. It is important to serve this population, since many of the medical and financial consequences of being uninsured can occur even during short periods without coverage. At the same time, this population is particularly difficult to serve, since its members have less time and incentive to learn about programs, and need to join and leave programs at different points during the year. Prorated eligibility determinations throughout the year would be particularly useful for low-income workers who lose jobs that offer health insurance coverage. Targeting groups in transition, such as individuals moving from one job to another who expect to be uninsured only for a short period, also might have advantages.
Fifth, all programs that target coverage to subsets of the population must have some phaseout mechanism. But phaseouts could have perverse effects. For example, premium assistance targeted to low-income families might provide these families with an incentive to keep their incomes below the phaseout range. As the incomes of these families increased, they would risk losing their access to low-cost coverage. If a program targeted firms below a fixed-size cutoff, businesses might face a disincentive to grow larger. Programs targeting low-wage firms might deter those firms from hiring higher-wage workers. The magnitude of these phaseout effects depends on the generosity of the initial incentive, the steepness of the phaseout, and the extent to which the phaseout coincides with other existing program phaseouts. For example, if the phaseout range of a new health insurance incentive or credit coincided with the phaseout range of the earned income tax credit, families whose incomes fell within both phaseout ranges would face an enormous implicit marginal tax.
Problems of Incremental Coverage
Universal coverage would readily solve all the problems described previously, as would a health insurance system that enrolled everyone automatically and then determined appropriate financing sources. If all Americans were automatically enrolled in a fully paid insurance plan, as nearly all elderly Americans are enrolled in Medicare Part A, coverage would be universal. Everyone, including those at high risk for high medical expenses, would have a venue in which to purchase coverage. Work transitions would no longer place people at risk of financial or health catastrophes, and the disincentives caused by program phaseouts would be eliminated.
5 Alternatively, a system of enforced coverage mandates, whether employer or individual mandates, also would go a long way toward eliminating these problems. However, in the absence of universal coverage and mandate proposals, policymakers need to consider incremental options that do not undermine existing coverage. 6 Two general types of incremental health insurance reform are possible: expansions of existing public programs, and expansions of coverage in other ways. The latter category includes programs that provide incentives to individuals or to employers, and those that create new purchasing arrangements for individuals or employers. Public expansions and other options also can be combined in various ways, or targeted at particular groups.
By definition, the funding for incremental expansions, including those discussed here, will not be large enough to cover all those currently uninsured. Thus, when examining new incremental programs, it is important to consider how many people will gain coverage through them. If expansions attract individuals who previously held private coverage (or who would otherwise take up private coverage), they will, at a given cost, cover fewer of the uninsured. The importance of this concern depends on the nature, cost, and quality of the subsidized program. It would be inefficient to encourage employees to drop lowcost, high-quality unsubsidized group coverage in favor of high-cost, subsidized, individual coverage. But improving the coverage of those who are underinsured or currently face excessively high out-of-pocket costs is also a worthwhile policy goal. Thus, it may be desirable, albeit more costly, to allow employees to drop poor quality group coverage with high employee premium shares in favor of better public coverage that facilitates access to care.
Many incremental expansion proposals contain provisions that seek to target coverage only to those previously uninsured.
7 For example, some proposals limit eligibility to those who are not eligible for an employer-sponsored plan, or to those who have not held employer-sponsored coverage in some preceding period (usually three to six months). These so-called ''firewall'' provisions raise three concerns. First, they favor employees and employers who failed to act in desirable ways (by failing to offer or take up coverage) and discriminate against those who acted in desirable ways. Second, they make it more difficult to provide coverage for some groups of the uninsured, particularly those who have recently lost a job that offered coverage and those who cannot afford the employee share of the coverage they are offered. Finally, they raise issues of enforceability and administrative costs. In particular, firewall provisions can prevent people from dropping coverage and immediately signing up to receive alternative coverage, but they cannot encourage people to take up new private coverage as quickly as possible. They also may throw up so many administrative hurdles that they limit participation or retention rates among those who truly do qualify.
All incremental health insurance expansions present targeting problems, which are likely to be more severe as the income of the group served increases, and as the new coverage program overlaps with existing private coverage. The greater the likelihood that public expansions and existing private coverage will overlap, the greater is the concern that expansions may not result in a net increase in coverage.
Targeting is an important consideration, but it should not be the only criterion on which to judge a program. No program can be perfectly targeted, and many existing health insurance incentive programs (particularly the tax exemptions for employer-sponsored insurance) are very poorly targeted (Glied 1999) . Programs that provide benefits to many people who were previously insured may, nonetheless, improve the well-being of low-income people. In particular, they can help people who change jobs and currently experience periods without insurance to retain complete and continuous coverage; they also may improve the quality of health insurance and enhance financial security.
Criteria for Evaluating Expansion Options
Any proposal for incremental coverage will have to address the problems described earlier. The problems are linked in a way that makes it impossible to solve them all at once. Increasing participation comes at the price of reducing targeting. Allowing people to take up coverage throughout the year makes it easier to accommodate transitions, but raises the risk of adverse selection. Thus, proposals must make trade-offs among goals. Different people will certainly prioritize these goals differently. However, in general, three considerations probably dominate. First, participation is a critical goal. A well-designed program that fails to reduce the number of uninsured is of little value. Second, wherever possible, people in similar situations should be treated in similar ways. This standard of equity is both compelling in principle and efficient in practice. Programs that treat similar people differently are likely to lead to distortions of labor markets as well as health insurance markets. Third, programs should provide the maximum possible benefit to those in need. Dollars should be targeted to the uninsured, underinsured, and those experiencing financial hardship as a consequence of the cost of health coverage. Mitigating specific issues such as timing, targeting, crowd-out, and selection should be viewed as means to these ends, not ends in themselves.
New Coverage Expansion Options
Policy options to cover the working uninsured fall into four categories: expansions of public coverage, individual purchase incentives, expansions of employer-based programs, and proposals that focus on specific groups. The other papers in this issue describe several specific examples of these approaches. This paper evaluates the effects, strengths, and weaknesses of these approaches.
Expanding Existing Public Programs
To date, most attempts to increase coverage have focused on developing and expanding public programs, generally for nonworking populations. During the 1980s, states, encouraged by the federal government, expanded their Medicaid programs to cover more children and pregnant women. More recently, several states have gone beyond federal mandates and both expanded Medicaid and developed new state programs for the low-income uninsured. In the 1990s, a new federal-state program, the State Children's Health Insurance Program, extended coverage to still more children. This program targeted higher-income children, who were likely to come from working families. One option for expanding coverage is to build on these existing programs (see Feder et al. 2001) . Expansions of public programs are likely to be particularly useful for workers who move in and out of particular jobs, or in and out of employment more generally. They are also likely to be a good way to reach the parents of children who already participate in (or qualify for) public programs.
Most proposed expansions of these programs would follow existing models. The federal government would offer states matching funds if they expanded these programs to new populations. Expansions of Medicaid and SCHIP likely would address the need for coverage among the lowest-income uninsured-those with incomes below 125% of the poverty line. Many families in this group likely held Medicaid or SCHIP coverage in the past, so they may be familiar with the operation of the programs and may have ties to providers who participate in them. This would be particularly true for programs that extended Medicaid or SCHIP coverage to parents of participating children. Such programs also might increase the take-up rate among eligible children by allowing families to address the insurance needs of all their members with one application, as most families with employer-sponsored insurance already do (Thorpe and Florence 1999) .
Public programs rely on existing state administrative capacity to determine eligibility and process applications. These state mechanisms are adept at adjusting to frequent changes in income and can process eligibility on a month-to-month basis. For those who participate in other means-tested state programs (primarily Temporary Assistance to Needy Families [TANF] and food stamps), eligibility and enrollment for expanded public health insurance programs can be handled as part of an existing process. Several states have adopted expedited application and eligibility processing systems, including systems that operate by mail or telephone. State programs offer a ready-made venue for the purchase of coverage and already monitor the quality of coverage offered through participating managed care plans. States already have developed methods of addressing the needs of higher-risk participants, either through carve-outs, risk-adjustment methods, or exemptions from managed care programs.
State administration of expanded public insurance programs also has costs, however. Working people may view public programs either as a welcome health insurance option or more negatively, especially if application forms are complex and participation requires interactions with the welfare office. In the past, there have been concerns that a ''stigma'' associated with public programs deters participation, but mounting evidence suggests that this effect is quite small (Remler, Rachlin, and Glied 2000) . Those not already participating in another public program cannot purchase new public coverage in the context of any other transaction, and signing them up is far from automatic. Thus it is not surprising that take-up rates for Medicaid have been disappointingly low among those who were not also eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and among children newly eligible for SCHIP (Currie and Gruber 1996) . These barriers are less likely to be important for those with health problems, who may be on the lookout for coverage, or who may use hospitals and other institutions that can provide information and enrollment assistance. Renaming public programs, changing their eligibility certification procedures, and linking them with private plans may reduce substantially any stigma associated with them. However, new programs will need extensive marketing efforts to attract applications from healthy people who might otherwise be unaware of them.
In summary, expanded public programs can readily address cost, venue, and timing problems in extending coverage, but they do not make coverage automatic. They must be combined with aggressive public marketing and outreach efforts. They are likely to be most effective in enrolling very low-income populations who already have experience with needstested programs and people with higher expected health care costs who are actively seeking coverage.
Subsidies to Individuals
Public programs provide insurance directly; another way to expand coverage is to provide financing to individuals, in the form of financial subsidies, so they can purchase their own health insurance. Insurance purchase subsidies can be delivered through tax credits or vouchers. Tax credit programs would operate through the existing administrative mechanisms of the Internal Revenue Service. A model for their operation is the earned income tax credit for low-income workers who file tax returns. Voucher programs would be operated by the states, with a federal match or subsidy. However, all states would need to develop administrative mechanisms that met federal standards to determine eligibility.
Individual premium assistance programs can be freestanding or they can operate as part of a system for purchasing insurance. The simplest system would allow qualifying beneficiaries to use their credits or vouchers in the existing individual insurance market. However, an unregulated insurance market also carries risks. As past experience with health insurance credits shows, some of the products sold in the private nongroup market would have little real value (General Accounting Office 1994). The fact that many beneficiaries would be fully financed by public premium assistance and would not be paying their own cash for the new products only increases the likelihood of fraud. Some proposals would require that all products paid for with credits have an actuarial value equal to or exceeding some minimum. However, such a provision would require states (or some federal agency) to make official determinations of actuarial value.
One alternative would be to provide individual purchase subsidies or subsidies for use in a more stringently regulated individual insurance market. A second alternative is to develop new institutional arrangements for purchasing coverage. These could take the form of new private purchasing pools. Alternatively, they might involve allowing the uninsured to participate in existing group purchasing arrangements. For example, credit or voucher beneficiaries could be allowed to use these payments to purchase coverage through FEHBP or through state Medicaid or SCHIP programs.
Individual subsidies operating through the tax system could target new funds to help low-income people buy coverage through the tax system, an existing and familiar administrative structure. Options that rely only on individual purchase subsidies would leave beneficiaries dependent on the individual insurance market. Faced with a large new group of potential buyers, the individual market might respond in innovative ways and reach out to enroll credit ben- eficiaries. The individual market is, however, likely to remain a costly place for people to buy coverage. Without further regulatory interventions, subsidies would not be sufficient to pay for insurance for highrisk people in this market. Conversely, some low-risk people might use the funds to buy products of little value.
New purchasing mechanisms for using individual subsidies could reduce administrative costs, at least slightly. They also might make it possible to ensure that high-risk uninsured people (qualifying beneficiaries) could afford coverage. Finally, they would offer those who often change jobs an efficient way to purchase coverage. These benefits carry costs, however. To avoid adverse selection against these new purchasing mechanisms, most proposals mandate that subsidies be used exclusively to buy coverage through these purchasing structures, even though some beneficiaries might prefer individual coverage. While new purchasing structures might offer many plan choices, the range of available plan characteristics likely would be more limited than in the individual market.
Subsidy programs tied to individuals, whether or not they are to be used in new purchasing venues, also must address a common set of problems. Subsidies administered through the tax system must be reconciled at year end, making them less useful to people whose incomes or insurance status fluctuate during the year. Individual premium assistance subsidies cannot be automatic-individuals must apply for them, have their eligibility determined, choose plans, and maintain payments. Subsidy programs rely on extensive marketing to convince people to participate. Finally, if subsidies were to be tied to the individual market, they might undermine, at least at the margins, the existing system of employer-sponsored insurance. If faced with an exodus of low-income people to new subsidy programs, some employers likely would stop offering (or not begin offering) health insurance. Figure 8 illustrates how different individual tax credit-based options would differ in their effects. The estimates summarized in Figure 8 (and in the figures that follow) all derive from a common model. The modeling effort is based on a common set of recent national surveys, with cost figures based on consistent health insurance premium estimates provided by Actuarial Research Consulting, Inc. 8 The model is based on the health insurance tax credit model developed by Jonathan Gruber of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who provided estimates for the basic tax credit proposal (Gruber 2000) . Various extensions and modifications on Gruber's model yielded take-up rates for the other plans. A full summary of the model is available from the author on request (Glied and Ferry 2001) .
The options for which Figure 8 shows estimated coverage effects all assume use of the same basic tax credit (see Zelenak 2001) . The basic tax credit can be supplemented by a range of administrative structures. In this paper, we evaluate the use of mandatory private purchasing pools, a Medicaid/SCHIP optional buy-in, and a FEHBP mandatory buy-in proposal that incorporates reinsurance. Each of these purchasing structures also would allow participation through the SCHIP program for eligible children. Detailed descriptions of these proposals are provided in the papers by Curtis, Neuschler, and Forland (2001, p. 159); Weil (2001, p. 146); and Fuchs (2001, p. 177) .
These options would provide health insurance coverage to nine million to 14 million people who otherwise would be uninsured. They also would provide financial assistance toward the purchase of coverage to 14 million to 19 million low-income people who currently purchase coverage at substantial costs. Finally, the options that would allow firms to join purchasing pools would enroll an additional 15 million to 21 million people (one to two million of whom were previously uninsured) not receiving tax credits into new, lower-cost purchasing arrangements. In the simulation model used here, people leave existing coverage for new insurance only if they will experience a substantial reduction in out-of-pocket costs by doing so. Given the subsidy design described here, this move from unsubsidized to subsidized coverage is only likely to happen for those with both low incomes and high current out-of-pocket costs.
The proposals that incorporate a new structure for purchasing coverage all have somewhat higher estimated take-up rates than the basic tax credit. In our estimates, adding a new structure has a modest effect (5%) on the price of health insurance and this, in turn, increases take-up slightly. A more important feature of the designs considered here is that they enable families with SCHIP-eligible children to obtain coverage as a family unit. This feature substantially increases take-up, especially among the lowestincome subsidy recipients. These recipients are also those most likely to be currently uninsured.
The final feature that separates these proposals is their treatment of high-risk people. The basic proposal envisions a standard, experience-rated individual insurance market, so low-risk people face low prices but high-risk people may not be able to afford coverage. The private purchasing pool proposal creates a single, community-rated insurance market, raising prices for low-risk people and lowering them for high-risk people. In the Medicaid/SCHIP buy-in proposal, subsidy recipients may choose between the individual insurance market and the SCHIP pool. We expect that the lowest-risk recipients would choose the individual insurance market, while the SCHIP pool would act, in effect, as a high-risk pool for the highest-risk recipients. This means that low-risk purchasers would pay lower rates, while high-risk purchasers would be subsidized separately through the SCHIP pool. This separation leads to increased takeup rates. Similarly, in the FEHBP proposal, the separate reinsurance market provides an alternative source of subsidies for high-risk purchasers. Reinsurance lowers premiums in the plan, raising take-up rates among both those currently uninsured and those who currently have costly coverage.
These differences in take-up rates translate into differences in the cost per newly insured person (Figure 9) . The Medicaid buy-in proposal is a little less costly than the others because SCHIP, which has established panels of relatively low-cost providers, can offer care to high-risk people at lower cost than we expect can be obtained in the individual market. The FEHBP proposal is a little more expensive than might be expected because the reinsurance cost also must be included in the cost of the proposal.
Options for Building on the Employer-Sponsored Base
Neither the individual market nor new administrative arrangements address all the problems inherent in providing a structure for delivering new subsidies for purchasing insurance. Another way to expand coverage is to couple a subsidy program with mandatory or voluntary programs that expand employer-sponsored coverage. Examples of this approach include employer mandates, such as pay-or-play laws that require firms either to offer and finance coverage or to pay a payroll tax toward coverage in a public program (U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care 1990). They also include mandates that firms offer (but not finance) coverage (Wilensky 1987) . Employers then would perform all insurance administration functions on behalf of their employees, including plan negotiation, selection, and payroll deduction. Larger employers probably would act as insurance groups, while smaller employers would have a strong incentive to participate in a purchasing pool or to join an extended FEHBP if such options were available. Employers also could automatically enroll employees in individual premium assistance or public insurance programs, using payroll deductions to handle employee premium payments.
Approaches that expand employer-based coverage would be useful primarily to the 79% of uninsured people who are members of working families. Within this group, employer-based coverage would be most valuable to those who have steady jobs with one employer. Once their employers agreed to offer coverage, then enrollment, marketing, and premium payment through payroll deduction would become as automatic for these workers as for others with employer-sponsored coverage. Employers could take advantage of administrative economies in purchasing coverage and have more access to information through employer groups or brokers. As a consequence, employment-based coverage probably would be less costly and of higher quality than coverage in the nongroup market. Options that build on the employer base could involve subsidies to individuals that could be used to purchase employer-sponsored coverage, subsidies to firms to encourage them to offer such coverage, and new purchasing structures that would make it easier for firms to offer coverage.
Working through employers adds another set of actors to the process of expanding coverage. While employee earnings and the cost of coverage are clearly the most important determinants of whether employers offer coverage, it is not clear that purchase subsidies would induce many employers not currently offering coverage to begin doing so. Firms that do not expect to remain in business long, that have high employee-turnover rates, or that experience cash-flow problems may not wish to add coverage even with employee or employer premium assistance or credits.
Similarly, employer subsidy and purchasing programs raise a second set of phaseout problems. Few proposals would allow all firms to participate in subsidy or purchasing schemes. This means that when firms grew or raised wages they might lose their subsidy payments. While most proposals incorporate gradual phaseouts for individual subsidies, few describe phaseouts by firm size.
Third, even if firms want to offer coverage, the small group market often makes it difficult for them to do so. New mechanisms for the purchase of coverage and a system of employer subsidies could encourage more employers to offer insurance. However, allowing firms to use new purchasing structures would raise the risk of adverse selection against these purchasing arrangements. Furthermore, it might alienate insurance agents and brokers, who provide services to these firms.
Finally, programs that operate through employment raise issues of targeting. About 36% of Americans have family incomes that would qualify them for individual premium assistance, and also have at least one family member with an offer of employer coverage. However, the difficulty is that 59% of the people in this group already have employer coverage. An estimated 54% of those not taking up coverage today will have coverage within a year even without any subsidy (author's tabulations of the March 1998 and March 1999 CPS). We know little about the quality of that coverage or the financial burden it places on low-wage workers. We also do not know the degree to which subsidies might help these workers retain coverage within their employer plans. Nonetheless, these statistics suggest that programs that allow people to use premium purchase subsidies to pay down their share of employer premiums would be a less effectively targeted approach than individual subsidies.
The impact of options that build on the employer base is summarized in Figure 10 . One proposal would permit the basic tax credit to be used toward the purchase of employer-based coverage (see Merlis 2001, p. 121) . This proposal would provide coverage to about three million more previously uninsured people than the basic tax credit proposal, for a total of nearly 12 million previously uninsured. It also would provide subsidies to 56 million additional lowincome workers, covering a portion of their share of employer-sponsored insurance costs. Proposals to help workers buy employer-sponsored coverage tend to be more costly per newly uninsured person than individual-based proposals. This result is a consequence of the fact that most employees offered coverage already are taking it up (though many face very high costs to do so). The higher take-up rate among the previously insured in this proposal generates a higher cost per newly insured person.
Two other options described in this issue encourage employers to offer coverage (see Meyer and Wicks 2001, p. 202; and Rosenbaum, Borzi, and Smith 2001, p. 193) . One option would simply offer premium assistance to employers. The other also would allow employers to buy into SCHIP. This latter proposal could be based either on workers' wages or family incomeswe illustrate costs and consequences of both configurations. Both employer-offered options would cover from one million to two million of those previously uninsured, and provide subsidies to three million to 20 million of those currently covered. The subsidyϩSCHIP proposal also would allow firms to participate in SCHIP even if they and their employees were not eligible for subsidies. Through this feature, from 12 million to 28 million people-about one million of whom were previously uninsured-would obtain less costly SCHIP coverage. At the firm level, the subsidy structure for the firm subsidy proposal is more generous than that in the subsidyϩSCHIP proposal, thus the former generates more take-up among the previously uninsured than does the latter.
The difference in cost between the two subsidyϩSCHIP estimates reflects the difference between using hourly wages or annual incomes in computing subsidies (Figure 11 ). Since many workers paid low hourly wages live in households that also include a highly paid worker, and since the family income of two low-paid workers can still be relatively high, programs that use wages, rather than incomes, to target subsidies will tend to be more costly.
Addressing the Needs of Special Populations
Health insurance in the United States is built around several institutional structures, most notably employersponsored coverage and the Medicare program. Another way to expand coverage is to focus on the needs of populations who are in transition between these existing institutional structures, or who move in and out of them. Two natural transition populations to target are those nearing Medicare age (people 62 to 64 years old), and those leaving employer coverage.
There are more than 900,000 people ages 62 to 64 without health insurance. A further 9%-or about 500,000 adults-in this age group buy individual nongroup coverage, which can be very costly. One way to help this population would be to simply lower the age of eligibility for Medicare, from 65 to 62. Another possibility would be to permit people in this age group to buy into Medicare, which is less costly than private nongroup insurance (Loprest and Moon 1999) . President Clinton's proposed budget for fiscal year 2001 (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2000) would have permitted all Americans ages 62 through 64, and displaced workers ages 55 through 65, to buy into Medicare. In addition, retirees 55 and older whose employer withdrew employer-sponsored retirement health benefits would have been able to extend coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985-so-called COBRA coverage-until reaching age 65. To make these options more affordable, a tax credit equal to 25% of the premium of either the Medicare buy-in or COBRA coverage would have been available.
A problem with offering subsidies to the pre-Medicare population is that a system of income-based subsidies might induce retirement and might discourage savings. An alternative approach to this population would target subsidies to those with lifetime low incomes (see Short, Shea, and Powell 2001, p. 214) . By using lifetime income as the criterion for subsidies, this approach would not discourage working and saving. Furthermore, lifetime income information could be collected based on the existing records of the Social Security Administration. Since these records already exist, subsidies could be delivered to those eligible automatically, without requiring them to file an application.
A second important group in transition is the unemployed and those moving in and out of the labor force. About 33% of those currently uninsured were insured through an employer during the preceding calendar year.
9 Job transitions are not only an important cause of a lack of insurance; a substantial body of research suggests that fear of losing coverage reduces job mobility, at considerable economic cost.
The existing COBRA legislation provides workers who leave jobs with an opportunity to keep their health insurance by buying into the group sponsored by their former employer. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 guarantees that workers leaving a job with health insurance will be eligible for new nongroup or employer-sponsored coverage. Neither of these laws helps those in transition pay for their coverage. An option to help people pay for COBRA coverage is discussed in the paper by Gruber (2001, p. 225) .
Proposals that focus on populations in transition are not designed to develop new institutions. They envi- sion that no one will remain with the transitional insurance program for very long. Instead, they offer the uninsured (and those with high insurance costs) better short-term options. For this reason, enrollment in transitional programs should be as nearly automatic as possible. People who do not expect to participate in a program for long will be unlikely to invest much in learning about the program or applying for it. The existing COBRA program provides workers with information about continuing their current coverage. While employers already are mandated to provide this information to workers, they have strong disincentives for doing so because COBRA has administrative costs. To be effective in reaching this population, any new transitional program will have to reduce these costs.
A new transitional program for the pre-Medicare population also will have to develop mechanisms for informing eligible people. If eligibility for subsidies for this population were made more nearly automatic, enrollment would be much simpler. The effect of making eligibility more automatic is illustrated in Figure  12 . Under voluntary enrollment, a subsidy program for the lifetime low-income pre-Medicare population would enroll about 300,000 people, including about one-ninth of the 900,000 currently uninsured ages 62 to 64. By contrast, a program incorporating automatic enrollment would enroll about 800,000 people, including nearly half of the uninsured in this age category.
Conclusions
No single incremental approach is likely to meet the needs of all the uninsured. Nor does any single approach perfectly balance issues of participation, targeting, and equity. Policymakers will always face trade-offs among these goals.
Many of these strategies complement each other. The strategies described earlier could work together to address the diverse needs and situations of the uninsured. Approaching the uninsured from many angles at once is likely to be more effective than using a single approach in isolation. While our fragmented and heterogeneous health insurance system appears to call for innovations that add rationality and order, a more effective incremental approach may be to add further complexity. The structural gaps and population needs are diverse and a mix-and-match approach may work best. The options described here and elsewhere in this issue would likely work best if coupled with each other, as part of a systematic approach to building new bases to cover the uninsured. It is critical, however, that increased complexity remain at the level of the program and not overwhelm the participant. and March 1999 Current Population Surveys (CPS) for the sample of the population that appears in both surveys. The matched sample is used to project the experience of the entire population. Note that this procedure is likely to understate the extent of transitions because those who are lost to follow-up and do not appear in the second wave of the CPS are probably more likely to have experienced a transition than are those who remained in the sample. The estimates are roughly consistent with Short and Klerman's analyses of the SIPP (Short and Klerman 1998) . They find that slightly over half of the uninsured in 1992-1993 were uninsured for 12 months or more. 2 Exceptions to this nearly automatic enrollment process are the 7% of insured Americans who purchase individual insurance. 3 The substantial influence of nearly automatic enrollment mechanisms on take-up has been dramatically demonstrated in a recent study that focused on retirement contributions in a company that made a change to its payroll deduction policies for 401(k) plans (Madrian and Shea 2000) . Initially the company made payroll deductions only when employees specified a deduction level and chose a specific plan. After the change, the company automatically made a 3% payroll deduction and put it in a 104 money market fund, unless the employee chose otherwise. As a consequence of this change from manual to automatic enrollment, the share of new employees contributing to 401(k) plans rose from 37% to 86%, with most of the increase among those making the default contribution and holding the default plan. 4 As noted earlier, one way to address this problem (to some extent) would be to have incentives cover a fixed percentage of premiums. 5 In a universal program, phase-out problems would reappear in the form of high marginal tax rates introduced through the tax system. While these might also have work disincentive effects, it might be easier to avoid marginal tax rate cliffs in a coordinated, tax system setting.
Notes
6 At the state level, employer mandates are limited by Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) legislation. However, under certain circumstances, play-orpay strategies may be permissible (Butler 2000 
